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Economic Crisis and Democratic Breakdown  
in the Interwar Years: A Reassessment 
Jørgen Møller, Alexander Schmotz & Svend-Erik Skaaning ∗ 
Abstract: »Wirtschaftskrise und demokratischer Zusammenbruch in der Zwi-
schenkriegszeit: Eine Neubewertung«. The ‘Great Recession’ has rekindled dis-
cussions about the relationship between economic crisis and democratic break-
down, frequently based on analogies with interwar experiences. However, while 
the notion that economic crisis in general and the Great Depression in particular 
caused democratic breakdowns in the interwar years is widespread, most compar-
ative studies of the period between the two world wars have found no independ-
ent effect of crisis on democratic breakdown. In this study, we argue that the lat-
ter findings are premised on inappropriate standards of assessments and the 
exclusion of relevant cases. Based on an event history analysis including 33 coun-
tries with democratic spells in the interwar years, we find a significant, non-trivial 
relationship between economic crisis and interwar democratic breakdown. Our 
results corroborate the notion that economic crisis substantially increases the risk 
of breakdown in fragile democracies. But we also show that it is not last year’s 
economic performance that matters but rather longer-term developments. 
Keywords: Economic crisis, democratic breakdown, event history analysis, in-
terwar period. 
1.  Introduction1 
A number of scholars and pundits have argued that the financial and economic 
crisis that began in 2008 has had negative repercussions for democracy (Diamond 
2008, 2011; Krugman 2011; Puddington 2008; Schmitter 2012). The very phrase 
coined for the crisis, the “Great Recession,” is a paraphrase of the “Great Depres-
sion” of 1929-1933, and these disheartening predictions have tended to be based 
on what Bordo and James (2010) have aptly termed the “Great Depression Anal-
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ogy.” That is, the interwar experience is highlighted to make the case that the 
Great Recession is likely to be conducive to democratic regression (see, e.g., 
Krugman 2011). 
At first sight, this line of reasoning seems apt. In popular imagination and 
among most historians, the interwar democratic rollback is inexorably associat-
ed with economic crisis (e.g., Hobsbawn 1994; Mazower 2000; Overy 1994; 
Rotschild 1974). This view likewise pervades political science and sociology. 
Lipset (1981[1960], 64-70) famously argued – with direct reference to the demo-
cratic breakdowns in interwar Austria, Germany and Spain – that democratic 
survival depends on effective performance. Alongside welfare policies (health, 
education, and social security) and law and order, economic growth is one of the 
key parameters of such effectiveness. The argument is straightforward: Both 
elites and masses generally prefer high economic growth. In times of economic 
crisis they are negatively affected and therefore less inclined to support the politi-
cal regime and more willing to back autocratic alternatives. Diamond (2011, 17), 
a former student of Lipset’s, has summarized the perspective as follows: “If no 
crisis supervenes, democracies with weak legitimacy may muddle along for 
some time, but when they lose their effectiveness, they collapse.”  
The notion that poor economic performance undermines democratic stability 
is also supported by numerous large-N studies (e.g., Bernhard, Reenock and 
Nordstrom 2003; Gasiorowski 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Przeworski et 
al. 2000; Svolik 2008; Teorell 2010). Nonetheless, the clear majority of scholars 
who have actually carried out comparative analysis of the relationship between 
economic crisis and democratic breakdown in the interwar period have ques-
tioned or outright rejected that economic crisis had an independent effect on 
democratic breakdown (Berg-Schlosser 2002; Bermeo 2003; Ertman 1998; Linz 
and Stepan 1996, 80; Luebbert 1991, 307-8; Saalfeld 2002; Zimmermann and 
Saalfeld 1988).  
It is not that these scholars completely dismiss the importance of economic 
crisis. Several of them argue that misery had a more conditional effect on dem-
ocratic breakdown. For instance, Zimmermann (1987, 1988) and Zimmermann 
and Saalfeld (1988) use a matching logic, the premise of which is the observa-
tion that economic crisis had different effects in otherwise similar countries. 
This procedure makes it possible to identify the factors which conditioned the 
political repercussions of crisis. According to Zimmermann, the key factor is 
whether a national consensus formation took place in the face of crisis or not 
(see also Saalfeld 2002). 
These nuances are important. But – as we show in more detail below – they 
do not alter the general conclusion that there was no independent effect of crisis 
on democratic breakdown. The importance of this cross-national non-finding is 
hard to overestimate. If the economic crisis of the interwar period – the deepest 
crisis of modern times, in a period where democracy was challenged in a more 
general sense – did not directly contribute to democratic breakdown, one would 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  303 
be skeptical about economic crisis being conducive to democratic breakdown 
in other periods, including the present. 
However, in what follows we argue that the comparative studies questioning 
the independent effect of crisis on breakdown are based on inappropriate (de-
terministic) standards of assessment, the exclusion of relevant cases, lack of 
data, and static rather than dynamic analyses. Addressing these shortcomings, 
we interrogate the relationship with event history analysis (aka survival analy-
sis), include 33 countries with democratic spells in the interwar period, and 
enlist more comprehensive data on economic growth. Our analysis reveals a 
robust, statistically significant relationship between our main measure of eco-
nomic crisis, a three-year moving average of economic growth, and democratic 
breakdown. We conclude with a brief discussion about what this finding tells 
us about the democratic consequences of the current economic crisis. 
2.  Previous Comparative Studies  
Twenty-six years ago, Zimmermann and Saalfeld (1988, 305) noted that the 
relationship between the world economic crisis of the 1930s and interwar dem-
ocratic breakdown has “been among the most under-researched areas in politi-
cal science, at least in terms of cross-national analysis.” A direct consequence of 
the Great Recession is that the political repercussions of the interwar economic 
crisis have attracted renewed attention. But so far, it has been the electoral shifts 
unleashed by the crisis that have been placed under scrutiny (see, e.g., Bromhead, 
Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2013; Lindvall 2012). To our knowledge, only Berg-
Schlosser (2002, 307-9) has carried out a comparative examination of the rela-
tionship between economic crisis and democratic breakdown in the interwar 
years using a dynamic, statistical analysis, and his study only includes 15 Euro-
pean countries and relies heavily on interpolated data. Virtually all other attempts 
to interrogate this research question cross-nationally have been based on simple 
bivariate comparisons of conditions and outcomes across some but not all 
relevant interwar cases.2 
What unites these comparative analyses is their surprising conclusion: that there 
is no independent effect of economic crisis on interwar democratic breakdown.3 
The objections marshaled against the relationship can be summarized in two 
                                                             
2  See, e.g., Bermeo (2003, 22); Ertman (1998); Linz and Stepan (1996, 80); Luebbert (1991, 307-
8); Mann (2004, 56-8); Saalfeld (2002); Zimmermann and Saalfeld (1988). All of these authors 
only include some of the democratic spells of the interwar period, mainly European ones. 
3  In most of the works referenced, this is only a secondary argument made to dismiss this 
factor and thereby pave the way for formulating an alternative explanation for interwar 
democratic stability. 
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points. First, as illustrated in Table 1, nine out of 23 interwar breakdowns – and 
five out of twelve breakdowns in Europe – occurred before the Great Depression.  
Table 1: Democratic Survivors and Breakdowns in the Interwar Years 
Survivors Breakdowns 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, USA  
Argentina (1930), Austria (1933), Bulgaria 
(1920, 1934), Chile (1924, 1927), Dominican 
Republic (1928), Estonia (1934), Germany 
(1933), Greece (1935), Guatemala (1931), 
Honduras (1935), Italy (1922), Japan (1932), 
Latvia (1934), Lithuania (1926), Nicaragua 
(1936), Panama (1928), Poland (1926), 
Romania (1920, 1930), Spain (1936), Uru-
guay (1933), Yugoslavia (1929)  
Note: The years in parentheses denote when the respective countries experienced democratic 
breakdown. This is based on Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2014), using a threshold of 
≥4 on their Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, which signifies that the chief executive 
offices and the seats in the effective legislative body are – directly or indirectly – filled by 
elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently 
free to enable the opposition to win government power. 
 
Second, the economic crisis of the early 1930s not only hit the cases experienc-
ing democratic breakdown but also the democratic survivors. In fact, in some 
democratic survivors, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia, 
the crisis was almost as devastating as in breakdown cases such as Austria and 
Germany (Linz and Stepan 1996, 80; Luebbert 1991, 307-8; Mann 2004, 56-8; 
Saalfeld 2002, 210-5). Moreover, in some of the crisis-ridden countries, such as 
the UK, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, the vote share of anti-
system parties hardly increased, and democracy was not seriously challenged 
from the inside (Capoccia 2001; Mann 2004, ch. 2). 
As mentioned above, these objections are not used to outright dismiss the 
relevance of crisis. A number of scholars identify a conditional relationship, 
based on how political systems processed the crisis. Nonetheless, the studies 
reject the independent effect of crisis, which is striking considering that so 
much large-N evidence support the existence of such an effect (e.g., Bernhard, 
Reenock and Nordstrom 2003; Gasiorowski 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 
1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Svolik 2008; Teorell 2010). 
There might be a rather simple explanation for this surprising disjunction in 
findings on the relationship between economic crisis and democratic break-
down. Notice that in the comparative work on crisis in the interwar period 
reviewed above, the independent effect of economic crisis on democratic 
breakdown is basically rejected because the relationship only fits some, not all 
cases. This is exemplified by Saalfeld’s remark that the problem with the crisis 
variables is that they “leave a considerable proportion of the variation unex-
plained” (Saalfeld 2002, 212; see also Bermeo 2003, 230; Linz and Stepan 
1996, 80; Luebbert 1991, 308). Based on these almost deterministic inferential 
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standards, scholars have concluded that “the severity of the Depression as such 
is not a sufficient condition of democratic regime breakdown” (Saalfeld 2002, 
215),4 just as the hyperinflations of the 1920s were not sufficient (or necessary) 
for breakdown in the 1920s – and that, “an experience with hyperinflation, 
alone or in conjunction with the subsequent depression, does not account for 
much” (Luebbert 1991, 308). 
There are two problems with basing the analysis of the relationship on de-
terministic notions of necessity and/or sufficiency assessed by a simple match-
ing of scores on the condition (economic crisis) and the outcome (democratic 
breakdown) in some but not all of the relevant cases. First, the use of such 
demanding standards makes it very difficult to compare the findings for the 
interwar years with the more general findings about the political effects of 
economic crisis. The extant large-N statistical evidence indicating that econom-
ic crisis is conducive to breakdown is, after all, based on probabilistic statistical 
assessments. But most of these studies have not covered the interwar years 
(see, e.g., Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom 2003; Gasiorowski 1995; Hag-
gard and Kaufman 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Teorell 2010).5  
The second problem is empirical but also has to do with comparing chalk 
and cheese. The objections against the relationship between economic crisis 
and democratic breakdown referred to above ignore that the countries on the 
Atlantic Seaboard of Europe and their settler colonies in North America and 
Oceania entered the interwar period with very resilient democracies. Mann ac-
cordingly distinguish between “two Europes” (Mann 2004, ch. 2), the northwest 
where democracy was inherently stable throughout the interwar period and the 
east, south, and center where democracy was inherently fragile. Scholars have 
singled out the presence of a legacy of free democratic competition and structured 
party systems in the northwest and the absence of such a legacy in the rest of 
Europe as the most important reason for this disjunction (Bromhead, Eichengreen 
and O’Rourke 2013; Ertman 1998; Guzy 2008; Mann 2004, ch. 2). This political 
legacy was further reinforced by higher levels of socio-economic development, 
something that we also know to be propitious for democratic survival (Lipset 
1959; Przeworski et al. 2000). 
Recall from the Introduction that Diamond, in his summary of Lipset’s 
thoughts about economic crisis and democratic breakdown, singled out democra-
cies with weak legitimacy as the place we would expect crisis to hurt politically. 
The presence of a cluster of resilient democracies in Northwestern Europe means 
                                                             
4  Needless to say, concluding that X is not a sufficient condition of Y is the opposite of a 
deterministic argument. But our point is that the sufficiency-relationship is rejected based 
on a deterministic standard. 
5  For more comprehensive studies, see Svolik (2008) and Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 
(2001). The interwar period has also been included in more general tests of modernization 
theory (Boix and Stokes 2003; Boix 2011; Svolik 2008).  
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that it is implausible to expect economic crisis to be a sufficient cause of demo-
cratic breakdown in the interwar period.6 Crisis might of course still be necessary 
for breakdown. However, the very fact that the new democracies in Latin Ameri-
ca and Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe were fragile also makes this propo-
sition rather implausible. The interwar period was one of almost endemic crisis. 
Each of these crises – over the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the controversial 
treaties ending World War I, economic downturns, the rise of totalitarian move-
ments, government instability, and a contested international order (see Mann 
2004, 23-4; Mazower 2000; Overy 1994) – might have triggered breakdown in 
fragile democratic regimes, which were not bolstered by a legacy of electoral 
competition for government offices and/or high levels of development.7 
3.  Model and Data 
Based on the above considerations, the relationship between economic crisis 
and democratic breakdown in the interwar period is best analyzed using a 
standard probabilistic assessment, including as many instances of democracy as 
possible. To be sure, there is a tradeoff between our general perspective and the 
depth of analyses such as those of Zimmermann (1987, 1988; Zimmermann and 
Saalfeld 1988). Widening the scope of the investigation by enlisting more coun-
tries makes the problem of controlling for alternative explanations much more 
acute. We have therefore rerun our analysis with different batteries of relevant 
control variables for which data are available. It is heartening to note that our 
main findings, more on which below, are robust to these different specifications. 
Nonetheless, the tradeoff cannot be completely escaped and it is obvious that the 
some of the advantages of, for instance, Zimmermann’s more focused compari-
sons are lost when opting for a more general analysis. Our results are of course 
no better than the data we have been able to compile but, then again, they have 
the advantage of being based on a broader range of countries. 
We apply Cox’s (1972, 1975) proportional hazards survival model and in-
clude all independent countries with democratic spells in the interwar period 
for which we have been able to collect data on economic growth, i.e., all but the 
                                                             
6  The most telling illustration of the robustness of the old democracies is to be found before 
the interwar period, during World War One. As Payne (1995, 73-5) points out, the Western 
European belligerent democracies were so stable that they could deal with the massive 
strain of the war within the political system, e.g. via the creation of ‘national unity govern-
ments’. This stands in stark contrast to the situation in the weaker political systems in Cen-
tral, Southern, and Eastern Europe were the similar strain either produced outright regime 
collapse (Russia) or some kind of de facto military dictatorship (Germany). 
7  Svolik (2008) shows that consolidated democracies are not vulnerable to crisis but that 
fledgling democracies are. The greatest vulnerability is in the early phases. See also Bern-
hard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2003).  
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Dominican Republic, Panama, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Poland. Our 
sample includes 37 democratic spells in 33 countries between 1919 and 1939, 18 
of which ended in a democratic breakdown (see Table 1). Follow-up time equals 
the continuous democratic years of a country in the interwar period.8 
Regarding the classification of regime type presented in Table 1, we have 
used the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy compiled by Skaaning, Gerring 
and Bartusevicius (2014) to identify democratic spells and breakdowns. Coun-
tries are considered democracies if they are characterized by contested elec-
tions for executive and legislative offices (Przeworski et al. 2000, 15-8), mean-
ing that they score at least 4 on the Lexical Index. Some of the cases in Table 1 
are borderline cases in the sense that many scholars would not accept them as 
instances of democracy. We maintain that they achieve this status based on a 
minimalist definition, which solely emphasizes genuine electoral competition 
for leadership (Møller and Skaaning 2013). However, the fact that their demo-
cratic qualities differ substantially is something that has to be taken into con-
sideration when analyzing the effect of crisis. We do so by entering a variable 
measuring democratic legacy, the purpose of which is to isolate the effect of 
crisis on the new democracies. Together with a control variable measuring 
socio-economic development, this also serves to take into account the presence 
of the resilient “Northwestern” democracies. 
The two major crisis episodes of the interwar period – the “post-War” slump 
of 1919-1923 and the Great Depression of 1929-1933 – represented exogenous 
shocks which the target regimes had to respond to. What we set out to assess is 
basically whether democratic regimes proved resilient in this regard or not. In 
our analyses, we use the GDP per capita figures from an updated version of 
Maddison’s historical statistics of the world economy to measure economic 
crisis (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). We supplement these figures with data for 
Estonia from Klesment (2010) and for Bulgaria from Ivanov (2012). We run 
our models with three different specifications of the economic growth variable: 
one where growth is lagged one-year and two specifications measuring the 
moving average of growth over the two and three years preceding the event, 
respectively (cf. Przeworksi et al. 2000, 113).  
  
                                                             
8  Only with the end of World War I does a country enter the risk set relevant to our question 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1422). However, our results are robust to using contin-
uous democratic years as follow-up time (see: Jørgen Møller, Alexander Schmotz, and 
Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2015, Online Appendix to Economic Crises and the Breakdown of De-
mocracy in the Interwar Years: A Reassessment, HSR-Trans 25. doi: 10.12759/hsr.trans.25. 
v01.2015).  
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Figure 1: Economic Growth in Interwar Democracies 
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The kind of crisis we are attempting to gauge is a situation where the persis-
tence of the regime is threatened (see Svensson 1986, 133). The one-year lag is 
included to appreciate the standard measure of economic crisis in previous 
large-N analyses (e.g., Teorell 2010). Its relevance for breakdown can be but-
tressed by several different arguments. First, if it is predominantly elites that 
come together to terminate democracy, they may take their cue from the imme-
diate growth experience. Second, research on the economic voting shows that 
the effect of changes in economic trends is normally instantaneous; voters 
seemingly respond very fast to crisis (Lindvall 2012). Third, and reinforcing 
the two former points, we do not know if other events may have undercut effi-
cacy, effectiveness, and legitimacy in the past. Given a poor track record, one 
year of crisis might be enough to topple the regime. 
These are all plausible arguments. However, we expect that it takes more 
than one year of disappointing economic performance to undercut “the capacity 
of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset 
1959, 86) – for example, via the kind of political overload seminally described 
by Huntington (1968). Likewise, we expect that it takes some time for pressure 
against the regime to be organized to the extent that toppling the regime be-
comes a practical possibility, given a collapse of performance-based legitimacy 
(Brady 2009). Mann (2004, 58) makes this point succinctly with respect to 
interwar Europe: 
Why should we expect last year’s trade or unemployment figures to generate 
this year’s coup? Political movements take a few years to build up steam. Maybe 
the general aura of economic crisis in the period is what matters more in weak-
ening regimes and giving authoritarians, including fascists, the chance to air 
their solutions and get organized. 
Seen from this vantage point, even a fragile regime should be able to weather a 
one-off shock, possibly due to exogenous shift in economic conjectures. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1 above, year-to-year growth rates fluctuate wildly in 
the period we investigate and the single year’s experience is unlikely to provide 
a general political compass for citizens and elites. Regime breakdown is most 
plausible in a situation where a large part of the citizens and/or elites perceives 
the disappointing economic performance as a protracted attribute of the regime 
and where citizens and/or elites have time to mobilize against the regime. 
Hence, we expect to find more pronounced statistical effects of specifications 
capturing the growth experience of several years. It is this intuition which is 
behind the use of moving averages covering the two and three years, respec-
tively, preceding the event (see Bromhead, Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2013). 
These specifications – and especially the three-year moving average – also 
have the virtue of easing out the fluctuations illustrated in Figure 1. 
We include seven control variables in our models. First, as mentioned above, 
we enter a measure of democratic experience, operationalized as the number of 
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years of uninterrupted democratic experience (+1 and then logged) based on 
the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartuse-
vicius 2014).9 To measure socio-economic development (GDP per capita), we 
rely on the sources for economic growth rates mentioned above. Furthermore, 
we include three dummy variables indicating whether a country was among the 
losers of World War I, whether there were strong landlords after World War I, 
and whether there is a high level of ethnic diversity (see Bromhead, Eichengreen 
and O’Rourke 2013). 10 We also include two variables to hold institutional factors 
constant, one measuring whether the country has a presidential system, the other 
the character of the electoral system (see Hermens 1941; Linz 1990). Finally, we 
have rerun our model with a different specification of the Agrarian Elite11 varia-
ble and with an additional control variable distinguishing between old countries, 
which existed prior to World War I, and the new countries brought into existence 
in the aftermath of the war. These additional results, which were very similar to 
the ones achieved using our baseline models, are reported in an online appendix. 
In the appendix included at the end of this paper, we present the scores for the 
time-invariant control variables included in the baseline model. 
4.  Event History Analysis 
Table 2 below presents the results of the Cox regressions for each of the three 
specifications of economic crisis and the control variables.12 As expected, we 
do not find a statistically significant effect of the one-year lag of the economic 
growth rate (Model 1). Similarly, the two-year moving average has only a mar-
                                                             
9  We code Ireland based on the UK score because Ireland was a constituent unit in the United 
Kingdom – Irish representatives sat in Westminster and had experience with democratic 
competition – before its independence in 1921 (see Mann 2004, 42). 
10  See, e.g., Lipset (1959); Przeworski et al. (2000); Holzer (2002); Overy (1994); Moore (1991 
[1966]); Stephens (1989); Kopstein and Wittenberg (2010). 
11  Our preferred version of this variable measures whether there were strong landlords after 
World War I, thereby taking into account that the landholding of the agrarian elite in a num-
ber of countries was significantly reduced after World War I – especially where the big land-
owners had primarily been of foreign nationality (see Rotschild 1974). Some accounts empha-
sizing the impact of agrarian elites, however, argue that the most important distinction is 
whether strong agrarian elites were present until the interwar period – and not necessarily 
during these years – which is captured by the alternative version of the Agrarian Elite variable. 
12  We tested the proportional hazards assumption of the Cox model using the Grambsch and 
Therneau (1994) numerical test and found evidence of non-proportional hazards for the 
variables measuring the continuous democratic years and marking World War I losers. Test 
results can be found in the appendix below. Following established best practice (Golub 
2007, 2008; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001) we adjusted for non-proportionality by in-
cluding interaction terms of the violating covariates with functions of survival time. We 
tested models with combinations of linear, logarithmic, and square function of time and 
report the ones fitting the data best according to Akaike’s Information Criterion.  
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ginally significant effect on democratic breakdown (Model 2). However, the 
effect of the three-year moving average is significant at the one percent level and 
it has a substantial effect on breakdown. Translated into likelihood ratios a one 
percentage point drop in the average level of growth in the three years preceding 
the current year (Model 3) results in a 11.6 percent higher risk of democratic 
breakdown (between 3.0 and 20.9 percent with 95 percent confidence).  
Table 2: Cox Proportional Hazards Survival Models of Interwar Democratic 
Breakdown 
 Democratic Breakdown 
(1) (2) (3) 
Growth t-1 
-0.004   
(0.017)   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.065*  
 (0.035)  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding) 
  -0.110*** 
  (0.041) 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 
-1.317* -1.378* -1.391** 
(0.771) (0.704) (0.684) 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) 
-0.506 -1.765 -1.776 
(0.619) (1.464) (1.441) 
Presidential System -0.753 -0.551 -0.522 
(0.558) (0.553) (0.525) 
Proportional System 
-0.983 -0.392 -0.312 
(0.846) (0.690) (0.613) 
Agrarian Elite  1.325** 0.934* 0.868* 
(0.590) (0.494) (0.499) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
0.220 0.157 0.235 
(0.453) (0.495) (0.469) 
World War I Loser 
2.646 1.725 1.868 
(2.066) (1.958) (1.811) 
Continuous Years Democratic * T2 
-0.026**   
(0.012)   
World War I Loser * ln(T) 
-1.159 -0.688 -0.758 
(0.906) (0.940) (0.902) 
Events 18 18 18 
Spells 37 37 37 
Observations 502 494 486 
Log Lokelihood -42.267 -43.233 -42.339 
LR Test 
32.638*** 30.188*** 31.299*** 
(df=10) (df=9) (df=9) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on countries) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, ***< .01. 
 
These results are robust to a number of different specifications (see the online 
appendix). First, since most of the non-findings reported above are only based 
on comparative analyses of European countries, we have also run separate 
analyses for the European spells only. These analyses are somewhat problemat-
ical due to the low number of cases. Nonetheless, the results reported in Table 
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2 are consistently reproduced. Second, our findings are robust to continuous 
democratic years as follow-up time, and to exchanging event history analysis 
with logistic regressions analysis, including iterations with both random and 
fixed effects. Third, the results are also robust to changing specifications of the 
Agrarian Elite variable and to adding yet another control variable, measuring 
the distinction between old and new countries. 
Next, in spite of the fact that the interwar economic crises were exogenous 
to most countries, some would probably be concerned about problems of en-
dogeneity due to different regime responses having different effects on the 
depth and spread-out of the crisis (cf. Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1988; Saalfeld 
2002). Yet, if problems of simultaneity were to occur we would expect the one-
year lag to be better predictors of breakdown than the moving averages.13 The 
fact that it is the three-year moving average specification which is statistically 
significant thus further mitigates concerns about endogeneity. 
Regarding the control variables, there is so high collinearity between demo-
cratic legacy and the level of economic development that only the latter becomes 
statistically significant when both are included in the same model. However, the 
tally of continuous years as a democracy is statistically significant when dropping 
GDP per capita (see the online appendix). Both variables exert a negative effect 
on the risk of democratic breakdown in all models. This corroborates the notion 
that some countries entered the interwar period with strongly consolidated de-
mocracies, based on prior democratic legacy and high levels of development. The 
presence of agrarian elites, in turn, consistently increases the risk of democratic 
breakdown throughout all models. Ethnic fractionalization and having been on 
the losing side in WWI do not have statistically significant effects. The two 
variables measuring institutional factors (proportional electoral system and 
presidential system) also produce insignificant coefficients. 
Can we conclude that a longer lasting economic downturn spurs democratic 
breakdown via the crisis mechanisms we have proposed above?14 This would 
                                                             
13  Tellingly, in all models a crisis specification based on the current year becomes statistically 
significant. We have not reported this because here endogeneity would be massively present 
almost by definition. For instance, if a democratic breakdown occurred in the first half of a 
year, the growth rate would predominantly capture the performance after – and thus af-
fected by – the breakdown. 
14  As mentioned above, seven interwar cases are not included in the analysis despite demo-
cratic spells because we lack data on economic growth rates. Considering the pivotal role 
played by European developments in the debate, we are most worried about the exclusion 
of three new democracies in East-Central Europe: those of Lithuania and Poland, which 
broke down in 1926, and that of Latvia, which broke down in 1934. However, descriptions 
of economic trends by historians indicate that the inclusion of these cases would not un-
dermine the results but rather strengthen them. First, Poland was severely hit by the post-
war economic crisis of the early 1920s (Saalfeld 2002) and the trigger of the breakdown in 
1926 is normally identified as the economic crisis unleashed by hyperinflation, including the 
breakdown of the zloty in the spring of 1926 (Rothschild 1966, 20-1, 73; Rothschild 1974, 
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probably be somewhat premature. The most important crisis episode – the 
Great Depression – began in 1929 but as Table 1 shows the highest incidence of 
breakdown is found in the years 1933-1936. This finding of course fits well with 
our expectations about the effect of crisis building up over a couple of years 
before triggering breakdown. But it also means that most breakdowns follow in 
the wake of what is arguably the emblematic regime change in the interwar peri-
od: the 1933 Nazi takeover in Germany. Especially in the relatively tight-knit 
European setting, such a crisis-triggered breakdown in a focal case could quickly 
increase the propensity of breakdown in neighboring countries (see Møller, 
Skaaning and Tolstrup 2013). Given the near-simultaneity of especially the 1929-
1933 crisis, this might plausibly have reinforced the negative political effects of 
crisis, particularly in Europe. This would represent yet another way in which 
crisis translated into breakdown – but, if so, it would also serve to undercut the 
independence of the cases and hence weaken our statistical test. 
5.  Conclusions 
We have attempted to shed light on the puzzle that, on the one hand, there are 
strong theoretical arguments for why economic crisis is conducive to democrat-
ic breakdown but, on the other hand, scholars carrying out comparative analy-
sis of the interwar period, arguably the most important historical concatenation 
of economic crisis and democratic breakdown, have tended to reject this rela-
tionship. This surprising non-finding seems to be an artifact of a particular set 
of methodological standards of assessment centered on necessity and sufficien-
cy, the lack of good time-series data for the interwar period, the failure to 
measure crisis using longer-term specifications, and the exclusion of relevant 
cases. Correcting for these problems, we find a robust, negative effect of eco-
nomic growth rates on democratic breakdown. 
Determining whether there is a relationship between economic crisis and 
democratic breakdown in the interwar period is intriguing in itself. But the 
question has recently become particularly pertinent to pose because of the 
focus on the potentially delegitimizing consequences of the Great Recession. 
Scholars, pundits, and politicians all have a natural tendency to use particular 
episodes of the past to understand the present – in casu via the “Great Depres-
sion Analogy.” Exactly for this reason, it is crucial that these key historical 
episodes are understood better. Our findings support the notion that economic 
crisis is conducive to democratic breakdowns.  
                                                                                                                                
52). Second, the Latvian experience strongly mirrors that of neighboring Estonia. In both 
countries democracy broke down in 1934, following the Great Depression. Third, the Lithua-
nian breakdown of 1926 is normally construed as relatively similar to that of neighboring 
Poland in the same year (Rothschild 1974). 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  314 
However, there are also two caveats. First, if we had corroborated the non-
findings of prior comparative analyses, this would have seriously undermined the 
plausibility of the current economic crisis spurring breakdowns. Yet the extent to 
which our results can be generalized to other periods, with less deep economic 
crisis and fewer challenges to democracy as a regime form, is more circum-
scribed. Second, our results show that a high level of socio-economic develop-
ment and a long democratic legacy mitigate the risk of democratic breakdown, 
even in the face of crisis. Thus, we would – pace some recent warnings (see, e.g., 
Krugman 2011; Schmitter 2012) – not expect the current economic crisis to be 
capable of triggering breakdown in developed countries with a long legacy of 
democracy (see Svolik 2013). It is first and foremost fragile, new democracies 
which are put under stress by crisis, especially when crisis is building up steam 
over several years. This might be the most important lesson that can be inferred 
from interwar Europe. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Values of Time-Invariant Control Variables 
 Presidential System 
Proportional 
System Agrarian Elite
Ethnic Frac-
tionalization 
World War I 
Loser 
Argentina  1 1 1 0 0 
Australia  0 0 1 0 0 
Austria  0 1 1 0 1 
Belgium  0 1 0 1 0 
Bulgaria  0 1 0 1 1 
Canada  0 0 0 1 0 
Chile  1 1 1 0 0 
Colombia  1 0 1 1 0 
Costa Rica  1 1 0 0 0 
Czechoslovakia  0 1 0 1 1 
Denmark  0 1 0 0 0 
Dominican Rep. 1 0 1 1 0 
Estonia  0 1 0 1 0 
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Table A1 continued... 
Finland  1 1 0 0 0 
France  0 0 0 0 0 
Germany  1 1 1 0 1 
Greece  1 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala  1 0 1 1 0 
Honduras  1 0 1 0 0 
Ireland  0 0 0 0 0 
Italy  0 0 1 0 0 
Japan  0 1 1 0 0 
Latvia  0 1 0 1 0 
Lithuania  0 1 0 1 0 
Luxembourg  0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand  0 0 1 1 0 
Netherlands  0 1 0 0 0 
Nicaragua  1 0 1 1 0 
Norway  0 1 0 0 0 
Panama  1 1 0 1 0 
Poland  0 1 1 1 0 
Romania  0 1 0 1 0 
Spain  0 1 1 1 0 
Sweden  0 1 0 0 0 
Switzerland  0 1 0 1 0 
United Kingdom  0 0 1 0 0 
Uruguay  1 1 1 0 0 
USA  1 0 0 1 0 
Yugoslavia  0 1 0 1 0 
Table A2: Proportional Hazards Tests for Table 2 
 Democratic Breakdown 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Growth t-1 -0.232   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.258  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.131 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1  0.159 0.215  0.221 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) -0.159* -0.167 -0.156 
Presidential System  -0.053 -0.037  0.02 
Proportional System  -0.112 -0.066 -0.075 
Agrarian Elite   0.257  0.265  0.314 
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.001  0.041  0.003 
World War I Loser -0.251* -0.327** -0.37** 
Global Test  8.098  8.482  8.237 
Note: Proportionality test following Grambsch and Therneau (1994). Entries depict correlations of 
Schoenfeld (1982) residuals with scaled survival time, thereby signaling time-dependence. Signifi-
cance levels: *<.1, **<.05. 
